Around two decades earlier, the amalgamation of Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness and the Democratic Unionist Party’s Dr Ian Paisley at the helm of Northern Ireland’s government instilled a sense of hope, earning them the moniker “the Chuckle Brothers”. Fast forward to the present, Sinn Féin First Minister Michelle O’Neill and DUP Deputy First Minister Emma Little-Pengelly demonstrate a similar camaraderie, humorously referred to as “the Chuckle Sisters”. However, this repetition isn’t as effective, as the nickname fails to truly resonate.
While the metaphor represents positivity, it’s becoming evident that the 1998 Belfast Accord – more commonly referred to as the Good Friday Agreement – is becoming outdated and urgently requires transformation, a task that’s challenging. Consistently delivering good governance has been an issue for the Stormont government.
Numerous demands for revision have been made over the years, a quick online search revealing roughly 23,000 instances of such requests. What’s concerning is the fact that the most feasible changes are the least impactful, while the impactful ones seem elusive.
Alan Whysall, who was integrally involved in the 1990s debates that brought about the peace deal, is now actively interested in the matter, given his position at University College London. According to him, the agreement is deteriorating in many ways. Compartmental remedies are not the solution to most problems, argues Whysall. Despite numerous adjustments, the effectiveness remains doubtful.
Instead, Whysall advocates for a cultural shift within Stormont. The primary problem lies not in the structures, but in the culture and momentum. The prevalent expectation to reinstate institutions and hope for the best is misguided, he warns. First and foremost, the protocol to elect a speaker in the Assembly necessitates change to ensure that neither Sinn Féin nor the Democratic Unionist Party can hinder the election again. This would facilitate the operation of the Assembly, committees, and exercise of oversight.
The election of a chairperson and the functioning of Stormont would potentially diminish the chances of the two main parties vacating their positions, as their departure wouldn’t result in the collapse of the whole establishment.
Presently, decisions of this nature necessitate a community-wide vote, which comprises a majority of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), including a majority from those identified as unionists or nationalists, or a 60 per cent majority with 40 per cent from both groups.
This approach was one amongst many, crucial to the mediation process of the agreement, designed primarily to alleviate the fears of nationalists of being overshadowed. However, it has become a ploy utilised by both Sinn Féin and the DUP to attain their agendas.
Lisa Claire Whitten, a research fellow in politics at Queen’s University Belfast, suggests the growing third faction in Northern Ireland — those who reject the classification of green or orange and are labelled as “neither” — should have increased representation.
She comments that the ‘binary community assumption’ underpinning the 1998 agreement no longer mirrors our demographics or recent electoral constitution. Furthermore, both Sinn Féin and the DUP are not receptive to fresh concepts that they have not originated or endorsed. There is a need for new perspective, adds Alan Whysall, previous Northern Ireland Office official and now part of University College London.
Under Whitten’s proposition, the “neither” group would receive equal consideration, demanding that community-wide votes need the agreement of each group, or a 60 per cent Assembly majority, with a minimum level of backing from each faction.
Moreover, the petition of concern process – where actions can be obstructed by 30 MLAs from two parties – should be adjusted to necessitate parties to demonstrate that the matter significantly impacts the people in Northern Ireland and “that it is likely to continue”.
However, Sean Haughey, a lecturer in politics and Irish studies at the University of Liverpool, asserts that while voters not aligned with any party have been the biggest individual group “for the past few years”, this is not yet reflected in the composition of the 90-seat Assembly, despite the expansion of the Alliance Party.
The established system that accentuates two identities has managed to endure due to a statistical fact: those who don’t identify as either unionist or nationalist are least likely to vote. If these two identities were given less emphasis within the political system, it’s likely that those who do not adhere to either could be more inclined to participate in the voting process, making it more beneficial for the democracy.
Nonetheless, caution should be applied concerning alterations to designation rules, as organizations outside of Stormont, such as the Orange Order, warn of severe political and legal implications, thereby deviating from the cornerstone principles of the Belfast Agreement.
Though small alterations could be beneficial, such as equipping Stormont’s committees with improved resources to handle the excessive amount of paperwork from the European Union. For these committees, despite being faced with significant challenges, have demonstrated their effectiveness.
Micheál Martin, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had previously stated before the restoration of Stormont’s institutions in February that any reform should follow the institution’s restoration rather than precede it, citing the necessity of a stable foundation to examine such issues.
On the other hand, even slight adjustments to Stormont’s regulations could diminish the influence of Sinn Féin and the DUP, who have just reclaimed control. As a result, convincing these two parties to agree on reforms that might affect their stance seems challenging.
Jason Whitten believes the opportunity for such reforms might have passed, suggesting a greater openness towards changes in legislation before Stormont Assembly was restored. If reforms were to be considered, it should have happened earlier.
Northern Ireland’s voting patterns haven’t transformed as quickly as anticipated, partly because older generations sustain a certain level of acceptance, considering the current situation an improvement on the past. This perception, which might seem unexpected in other areas, has slowed the progress of change.
Nevertheless, Haughey asserts there’s a desire for modifying the rules concerning the election of Stormont Assembly’s speaker. Past instances saw qualified candidates like SDLP’s Patsy McGlone being blocked from becoming speaker, despite having majority support in the house, due to existing rules.
Yet, the protocols that guide the choosing of the First and Deputy First Minister, which demands DUP and Sinn Féin to each select candidates independently, will pose a significant challenge to amend due to the fact that neither party wishes to alter it whatsoever, states an educational professional.
“Privately, they express that relinquishing such a potent veto, which they have both leveraged to their benefit on prior occasions when circumstances warranted, is not in their interest,” comments Haughey.
While Sinn Féin has heightened worries about being side-lined, it would indeed be the DUP that would likely find itself marginalised if changes were brought about, because they share the least common ground with all other parties.
In a previous year’s report, the House of Commons’ Northern Ireland Affairs Committee ardently encouraged an independent review of the accord.. Additionally, these investigations should be accompanied by a citizens’ assembly.
Along with the appointment of a Speaker, the committee also suggested that the First and Deputy First Ministers should be known as ‘Joint First Ministers’ and that they should be voted in by a weighted majority in order to avoid a veto by either dominant party.
The report was rejected by DUP, with its committee members publishing a dissenting document. In an equally important move, Sinn Féin opted to not provide evidence. Later, it stated that the institutions should be reviewed by Stormont’s Assembly and Executive Review Committee.
The above-mentioned body comprises predominantly of Sinn Féin and DUP members, a scenario that didn’t occur by chance.
“That’s the reason for my dismay when SF proposes to take the reform suggestions there since that’s the burial ground for ideas” comments Whysall.
A revamped Belfast Agreement, also known as Belfast Agreement 2.0, is not viable, Haughey contends, arguing that “its inherent democracy is intact”, which is not the case for the “exclusionary and veiled” alterations enacted subsequently, like the St Andrew’s Agreement.
This 2006 agreement revived the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Stormont government leading to Paisley being implemented as First Minister and McGuinness as Deputy First Minister.
The consensus among experts is that if a new Belfast Agreement was to ever be considered, it should coordinate with citizens’ assemblies to ensure that the rhythm is dictated by Northern Ireland society and not solely its politicians. However, this approach of decision-making by deliberation has been systematically sabotaged by Sinn Féin and the DUP in the past.
Whysall emphasises the need for a greater civic and corporate voice, advocating for the establishment of a robust, autonomous economic entity, akin to the enhanced version of the Economic and Social Research Institute in the Republic. Newton Emerson makes an observation about the ideological alignment of Sinn Féin and the DUP, claiming they’re often aligned on various issues.
Both parties have shown resistance towards new ideas not generated or approved by them, demonstrating an aversion to innovation, which, according to Whysall, is necessary for progress. He mentions that championing fresh concepts may lead to political displeasure, which could impact individuals or the bodies they represent adversely.
Whysall brings attention to instances where the business community has faced opposition from politicians for their proposals. He comments on the size of Northern Ireland, stating its smallness and the lack of entities that can openly defy the government like Ryanair often does.